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1 This work on the “Paradoxes of Post-Mao
Rural  Reform”  constitutes  another
masterstroke by  Warren  Sun  and
Frederick  Teiwes  in  the  Chinese  studies
arena.  As  the  authors  themselves
pointedly  note,  foreign  observers  have
had  the  misguided  tendency  to  swallow
the Chinese Communist Party shibboleth
that  depicts  the  reform  process  as  a
relatively  linear  and  consensual  process
and  assigns  all  credit  for  the  success  of
economic  reforms  to  Deng  Xiaoping
following  a  so-called  ideological  and
political  struggle  against  the  Hua
Guofeng-led neo-Maoist clan. 
2 Sun and Teiwes astutely show that while
the  Beijing  elites  went  along  with  the
rejection  of  the  Mao  regime’s  inherent
instability,  they  all  shared  –  Deng
included  –  an  attachment  to  the
collectivist  system.  Backed  by  solid
arguments and multiple sources, the authors also establish that while these elites were
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divided over how to go about improving the lot of the poorest peasants, it was above all
Hua Guofeng,  who with his  long experience in farming policy in Hunan and at  the
prefectural (Xiangtan) and provincial levels,  displayed pragmatism and tolerance by
accepting attempts towards family farming and dialogue with provincial cadres. Thus,
by  authorising practices  carried on earlier  in  secret  or  with local  authorities’  tacit
agreement, it was under Hua, not Deng, that a certain liberalisation of the agricultural
market began, eventually helping to free enough capital for investing in industry and
unleashing the Chinese economy. 
3 Melbourne-based  Warren  Sun  is  associate  professor  of  Chinese  studies  at  Monash
University. Frederick Teiwes is emeritus professor of Chinese politics at the University
of Sydney. While they have been published separately, the two have worked together
and produced many major publications since the mid-1990s: The Politics of Agricultural
Cooperativization in China: Mao, Deng Zihui, and the “High Tide” of 1955 (1993), The Tragedy of
Lin Biao: Riding the Tiger during the Cultural Revolution, 1966–1971 (1996), China’s Road to
Disaster:  Mao, Central Politicians,  and Provincial Leaders in the Unfolding of the Great Leap
Forward, 1955–1959 (1999), and The End of the Maoist Era: Chinese Politics During the Twilight
of  the  Cultural  Revolution,  1972–1976 (2007).  While  the  Australian  duo  are  known  for
conscientious analyses of the Chinese decision-making process and power struggles in
the CCP’s highest echelons,  they have also been interested in issues relating to the
country’s  agriculture  and  economic  development  policies.1 Having  covered  the
tumultuous Cultural Revolution period in their previous works, Sun and Teiwes have
over  the  past  several  years  been  engaged  in  studying  the  transitory  Demaoisation
period (1977-1981), with its pronounced economic and political reorientation.
4 Many points in the book stand out: first and foremost, Hua’s undeniable influence in
the agriculture sector. As “supreme leader,” it was he who decided to jail Maoists in
October 1976 and to call the first major conference on agricultural issues in December
that year. From then on, he allowed experimentations in the most desolate regions. His
prioritisation of agricultural problems was reiterated until  the Third Plenum of the
11th Central  Committee  of  the  CCP  (December  1978),  which  among  other  things
discussed  allocations  for  agriculture.  Interestingly,  this  policy’s  main  aim  was,
according  to  the  authors,  to  safeguard  the  state,  and  it  was  applied  with  no  well-
defined outcome in mind. As Zhao Ziyang noted,  its  positive results came as a real
surprise: clear augmentation of farmers’ living standards came side-by-side with a rise
in farm yields, which helped restructure the rest of the economy from 1984 onwards.
5 Second,  while  works on  the  period  essentially  showcase  Hua’s  “inefficiency”  or
“leftism” and the rupture that Deng’s ascent to power represented, Sun and Teiwes
attempt to show the continuities in their complexity. For different reasons, Hua and
Deng shared some characteristics (pragmatism, hankering for stability, and belief in
socialist collectivism). But Deng had no experience or acquaintance with rural reforms,
whereas Hua had been much engaged in this field in Hunan and had been asked by Mao
in 1975 to organise the first Dazhai conference. Accordingly,  Deng made only three
vague commentaries on the agriculture during this period. The authors explain that
after Deng took power, he merely “followed the movement” Hua had inspired and let
his protégés better versed in the domain – Wan Li, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang – take the
reforms forward. Without denying Deng’s qualities, Sun and Teiwes show that the two
leaders  demonstrated  enough  flexibility  for  new  ideas  to  be  implemented  and
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integrated in national policies. Far from being a stride towards clarity, it remained a
period of questioning, debate, and adjustment.2 
6 Finally, in one of their key points, the authors entirely refute the thesis of a politico-
ideological struggle between a radical Hua and reformer Deng. On farming matters,
they found no proof of dissension between the two leaders. The authors prefer to think
that Deng’s rise to power resulted from a failure on the part of elite Communists to
recognise Hua as one of their own as they favoured the “old revolutionary” Deng. Of
course, Deng was one of the major political and military figures of the revolution that
ushered in the People’s Republic and one of the top-ranking leaders before 1966, while
Hua, 17 years his junior, only joined the Party in 1938 and made it to its “centre” as late
as 1971 at Mao’s behest. This subject is alas not exhaustively dealt with, as the authors
are in the throes of writing another book on the same period specifically addressing the
political problems head-on.3
7 Given  the  scale  of  the  work  undertaken  and  the  major  contribution  the  book
represents, it  is difficult to pick out negative points.  That being said, its arguments
would  have  gained  weight  with  the  addition  of  more  figures  and  statistics  on
agriculture in the period considered. Moreover, to the extent that the authors insist on
continuity between Hua and Deng, it would have been useful if, in the introduction and
subsequent chapters, they had given a pre- and post-Mao account of the economy and
agriculture. While Sun and Teiwes point out some ruptures and continuities between
the  two  regimes,  one  is  left  wondering  about  the  impact  of  Mao’s  death  and  the
suppression of the “Gang of Four” on agricultural policies. 
8 This  dense  and  complex  book  is  certain  to  interest  all  historians  of  modern  and
contemporary China.  Sun and Teiwes bring out  Communist  China’s  complexity  and
prove  once  again  that it  is  possible  to  write  historically  on  the  subject  of  Chinese
political elites.
NOTES
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